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Abstract
A central question for pension design is how benefits should vary with the age of
retirement beyond early eligibility age. It is often argued that in order to be neutral
with respect to individual retirement decisions benefits should be actuarially fair,
that is, the present value of additional contributions and benefits (’Delayed
Retirement Credit’ - DRC) due to postponed retirement should be equal. We show
that in a self-selection, asymmetric information model, because individual
decisions are suboptimal, the socially optimal benefit structure should be less than
actuarially fair.
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A central question for pension design is how beneﬁts should vary with the age of
retirement beyond the earliest eligibility age.1 For examples of widely varying
pension beneﬁts designs in many countries, see Gruber and Wise (1999). In
the U.S., retirement ahead of the Normal Retirement Age (NRA), currently 65
but being raised to 67 by the year 2011, reduces beneﬁts by 5/9 of one percent
per month (about 6 percent annually). This is called the ’Actuarial Reduction
Factor’. Similarly, beneﬁts increase for retirement beyond the NRA up to age
7 0 .T h i si sc a l l e d’Delayed Retirement Credit’ (DRC).
Workers vary in many ways - in life expectancy, income levels and in the
degree of diﬃculty in continuing work. A good system needs to have ﬂexibility
in retirement ages to accommodate this diversity. (See Diamond (2000) lecture
3). It is often argued that it is desirable that the system be neutral with
respect to individual retirement decisions, implying that the incentive design
should be ’actuarially fair’ on average. That is, the present value of additional
contributions due to postponed retirement should equal the expected present
discounted value of additional beneﬁts.
The implicit assumption is that neutrality will preserve otherwise op-
timal individual decisions. We shall argue, however, that under asymmetric
information, this is not the case. Certain individual attributes relevant to
retirement decisions, such as labor disutility, are not observable by pension
suppliers (government or private pension ﬁrms) and therefore pension schemes
cannot depend on such attributes. Consequently, when individuals self-select
their optimal retirement age based on their personal characteristics, the ensu-
ing equilibrium is socially suboptimal: beneﬁts to retirees are constrained by
the need to provide suﬃcient incentives to continue work. DRC, by providing
an incentive to continue to work, alleviates this constraint and leads to a better
allocation of resources. This result holds even when all individuals have the
same life expectancy (see Diamond (2000), lectures 6 - 7).
1Earliest elegibility age (62 in the U.S.) is designed to strike a balance between those who
would, in the absence of such threshold, erroneously retire too early and others who have
health or other reasons to retire earlier and for whom this imposes a liquidity constraint. One
would like to know how this balance changes with increased life expectancy and morbidity.
Interestingly, social security reforms in the U.S. and Sweden left the earliest elegibility age
intact.
22 The Model
Consider three diﬀerent consumption levels: ca for active workers, c0
b for early
retirees and c1
b for normal (or delayed) retirees. The utility function for a
worker with labor disutility level θ is written u(ca) − θ. We assume that θ
is non-negative and distributed in the population with distribution F(θ) (and
density f(θ)). For convenience, we assume that f(θ) is continuous and positive
for all non-negative θ. The utility function of non-workers is v(c),w h e r ec will
take the values of c0
b or c1
b, depending on the age at retirement.
We assume that the marginal product of workers is equal and normalize
it to one. Thus, the only diﬀerence between workers is in the level of labor
disutility.
Let T0 be the age at which individuals have to make a decision whether
to take early retirement or postpone retirement to age T1, T1 >T 0.W i t h a
certain life span of T, the length of retirement time is either T − T0 for early
retirees or T − T1 for delayed retirement.
Normalizing the length of maximum retirement to one, delayed retire-
ment entails work for a period of length α (=
T1 − T0
T − T0
), 0 < α < 1,a n d
retirement for a period of length 1 − α(=
T − T1
T − T0
), while early retirement is
for a period of one. We further assume a zero subjective discount rate and zero
rate of interest.2
If all those with labor disutility below a certain level, θ0, work while the















2The results carry-over, with obvious changes, to the case with positive subjective dis-
count and interest rates.















where R are the resources available to the economy.
When c1
b−c0
b is positive, we call this diﬀerence the Delayed Retirement
Credit (DRC). Our objective is to analyze whether such credit is optimal and
examine the dependence of its level on exogenous factors.
3 First-Best: Labor Disutility Observable
To ensure that the maximization of (1) s.t.(2) entails that some individuals
work, we assume that when no one works, those with the least disutility of
labor prefer to work for an additional consumption equal to their marginal
product:
u(R + α) >v (R) (3)
This condition is called (Diamond-Sheshinski (1995)) the poverty con-
dition.
When labor disutility is observable, it is possible to determine the opti-
















4All non-workers enjoy the same level of consumption, c0∗
b = c1∗
b . Conse-
quently, the First-Best entails no DRC.
All individuals with disutility levels below a cutoﬀ θ
∗, θ
∗ > 0, should
work and the rest retire. The cutoﬀ is determined by comparing the utility
gain from extra work, α(u(c∗
a) − θ
∗)+( 1− α)v(c1∗
b ) − v(c0∗
b ) with the value of
extra consumption as a consequence of work, u0(c∗
a)(c∗
a − α − c0∗
b ).











a − α − c
0∗
b ) (5)
The First-Best allocation is determined by (4), (5) and the resource
constraint (2).
4 Second-Best: Self-Selection Equilibrium
Suppose now that labor disutility is not observable. Consequently, the cutoﬀ
θ is determined by individuals: given consumption levels, those with disutility
above the level which equates the utility of continued work and delayed retire-
ment to that of early retirement, will prefer working. Thus, the threshold θ, b θ,
is determined by:














5As u ﬃcient condition to make a retirement program socially desirable is
that the marginal utility of non-workers exceeds that of workers with the least




is termed (Diamond-Mirrlees, (1978)) the moral hazard condition.B y
(3), there is some work at the optimal allocation. Thus, at least the most able
worker (θ =0 )must work, implying u(ca) >v (c0
b),a n ds o ,b y( 7 ) ,u0(ca) <
v0(c0
b).
Maximization of (1) s.t.(2), with θ0 replaced by b θ ( w h i c h ,b y( 6 ) ,i sa
function of ca, c0
b and c1
































b]f (b θ) (11)
We have used (6) to obtain the derivatives of b θ w.r.t. ca, c0
b and c1
b.T h e
R.H.S. of these equations are the social values of resource savings from induced
changes in labor supply due to altered beneﬁts. The private return to working
is αca +( 1− α)c1
b − c0
b. Comparing this with the marginal product, α,w e
see that there is an implicit tax on work when αca +( 1− α)c1
b − c0
b < α.A s
seen from (9), this is the case if at the optimum there are some non-workers
6and v0(c0
b) > λ.W h e nb θ, (6), is an interior solution then (7) ensures that this
condition is satisﬁed.
Conditions (8)-(10) and the resource constraint (2) solve for optimum
consumption and the corresponding Lagrangean, denoted b ca, b c0
b, b c1
b and b λ re-
spectively.
From (8) and (10) we see that u0(b ca)=v0(b c1
b). Optimum delayed retire-
ment beneﬁts provide the same marginal utility as workers’ consumption.3
Dividing (8)-(9) by the respective marginal utilities and adding, we see

















Proposition. When the optimum allocation has workers and non-workers,
it has a positive delayed retirement credit (DRC) and an implicit tax on work.
Proof. With u0(b ca)=v0(b c1
b),w eh a v ef r o m( 6 )a n d( 7 )t h a tu0(b ca) <
v0(b c0
b). Hence, from (12), u0(b ca) < b λ <v 0(b c0
b) and v0(b c1
b) <v 0(b c0
b) or b c0
b < b c1
b.
The explanation of this result is straightforward. From the moral hazard
condition, (6), we know that an attempt to implement the First-Best allocation,
(4), is impossible because nobody will work. Any feasible policy that can
increase the beneﬁts of retirees without reducing workers’ welfare is desirable.
In the absence of DRC, c1
b = c0
b,t h ec u t o ﬀ b θ is determined by the condition
3If u(c) is a constant shift function of v(c),t h e nb ca = b c1
b.




u(b ca) −b θ − v(b c0
b)=0
(13)
Now introduce a small DRC, raising retirement beneﬁts for workers by
∆
1 − α
. Since these higher beneﬁts apply for a period of (1−α), total costs for





saves ∆ over the working period α and decreases
utility by u0(ca)∆. By the moral hazard condition, v0(b c0
b) − u0(ca) > 0,a n d
hence workers’ utility increases. Furthermore, the following inequality holds
for the marginal worker,






0(b ca))∆ >v (b c
0
b), (14)
implying that labor supply increases (by f (b θ)). Since there is a tax on
labor, b ca −1−b c0
b < 0, this enables an increase in beneﬁts for early retirees, c0
b.
5N o E a r l y R e t i r e m e n t
Suppose that θ has a ﬁnite upper bound, θ > 0.T h e’poverty-condition’,( 3 ) ,
ensures that the optimum involves some work. At the other end, suppose that
the optimum allocation involves no non-workers, that is, b θ = θ.T h i s m e a n s
that the consumption of non-workers, b c0
b, is set at a level (possibly zero) such
that nobody chooses early retirement. From (12) it follows that in this case,
b λ = u0(b ca)( =v0(b c1
b)).
From (8) (or (10)) and (11)4 we now obtain the condition, α(b ca − 1) +
(1 − α)b c1
b − b c0
b ≥ 0. Since there are no non-workers to support, there is no
4Modiﬁed (Kuhn-Tucker) conditions for a boundary solution.
8implicit tax on work5.
6 Two-Class Case: Comparative Statics
Consider an economy with two types of individuals: those with labor disutility
θ1 and those with θ2 (θ1 < θ2). Population weights of these groups are f1 and
f2 =1− f1, respectively. We assume that the optimum has the form that the
θ1 types work while the θ2 t y p e st a k ee a r l yr e t i r e m e n t .
Social welfare optimization now takes the form




b)(1 − f1)} (15)
subject to
[α(ca − 1) + (1 − α)c
1
b] f1 + c
0
b(1 − f1)=R (16)




b) ≥ α(u(ca) − θ2)+( 1− α)v(c
1
b) (17)
Condition (17) ensures that individual behavior coincides with that de-
scribed in the objective function and the resource constraint, (16). The moral
hazard condition and (17) imply that





5Another way to see this: from the resource constraint (2), when b θ = θ, α(b ca −1) + (1 −
α)b c1
b = R. Hence, b c0
b ≤ R (in particular, with no exogenous resources, R =0 , b c0
b =0 ). None
of the output of workers, α, is allocated to non-workers.
9Performing the maximization of (15) subject to (16)-(18), we obtain that
at the optimum u0(b ca)=v0(b c1
b) <v 0(b c0
b). Hence, b c1
b − b c0
b > 0.
We can use this example to analyze the eﬀect on the optimal conﬁguration
of an increase in longevity, i.e. a decrease in α.
Diﬀerentiating (16) and (18) totally w.r.t. α,v i e w i n gb c1
b as dependent on







u0(b ca)(1 − f)+v0(b c0
b)f1
[(u(b ca) − θ1 − v(b c1
b))(1 − f1)+









u0(b ca)(1 − f1)+v0(b c0
b)f1
[(b ca − 1 − b c1
b)u0(b ca)−







b)+( 1− α)u00(b ca)
> 0.






b)) < 0. Also, from


























u0(b ca)(1 − f1)+v0(b c0
b)f1
[β(u(b ca) − θ1 − v(b c
1
b)) +
+(1 − β)(u(b ca) − θ1 − v(b c
1
b))f1+ (21)







10As u ﬃc i e n tc o n d i t i o nf o r( 2 1 )t ob ep o s i t i v ei st h a tβ ≤ 1. This condition
holds when v00(b c1










6.Ar e d u c t i o ni nα reduces total output and
consequently the consumption of workers.
The change in consumption of non-workers depends on the magnitude of
the change in output relative to the change in consumption of workers. The
above condition implies that in order to maintain equal marginal utility of
workers before and after their (delayed) retirement, the reduction in workers’
retirement consumption, b c1
b, is not larger than the reduction in their consump-
tion while working, b ca.
In the special case where u(c)=v(c),s i n c eb ca = b c1
b, equations (19) - (21)





θ1(1 − f1)+v0(b c0
b)f1







u0(b ca) − θ1












b) − u0(b ca))f1 + θ1




The sign of the last expression is unambiguous due to the moral hazard
condition.
6This holds, for example, when u(c) is a constant shift of v(c).
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